From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from ip15.shellworld.net ([64.49.204.174] helo=server2.shellworld.net ident=root) by speech.braille.uwo.ca with esmtp (Exim 3.36 #1 (Debian)) id 1Enj9i-0002RN-00 for ; Sat, 17 Dec 2005 15:59:50 -0500 Received: from ip15.shellworld.net (jdashiel@ip15.shellworld.net [64.49.204.174]) by server2.shellworld.net (8.13.1/8.12.8) with ESMTP id jBHKxnkL038719 for ; Sat, 17 Dec 2005 20:59:49 GMT (envelope-from jdashiel@shellworld.net) Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 15:59:49 -0500 (EST) From: Jude DaShiell To: speakup@braille.uwo.ca Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Subject: re: /etc/suauth X-BeenThere: speakup@braille.uwo.ca X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list Reply-To: "Speakup is a screen review system for Linux." List-Id: "Speakup is a screen review system for Linux." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 20:59:51 -0000 The analysis is flawed. A machine with 99 user accounts on it and a root account with only one line in /etc/suauth with one user account on it presents a hacker with 98 decoys and one hackable account. The hacker has to go to the trouble of stealing a user account password not a root account password and that is more difficult to do. It never was only the possibility of irreversible system damage that was the only reason not to run as root on the internet with the security specialists in the first place. Now if on a 99 user account machine you insist on having 99 lines in /etc/suauth, then a hacker would have 99 possible targets and would be more likely to break into a machine.